资源论文Robust Learning for Repeated Stochastic Games via Meta-Gaming

Robust Learning for Repeated Stochastic Games via Meta-Gaming

2019-11-20 | |  50 |   33 |   0
Abstract In repeated stochastic games (RSGs), an agent must quickly adapt to the behavior of previously unknown associates, who may themselves be learning. This machine-learning problem is particularly challenging due, in part, to the presence of multiple (even infinite) equilibria and inherently large strategy spaces. In this paper, we introduce a method to reduce the strategy space of two-player generalsum RSGs to a handful of expert strategies. This process, called MEGA, effectually reduces an RSG to a bandit problem. We show that the resulting strategy space preserves several important properties of the original RSG, thus enabling a learner to produce robust strategies within a reasonably small number of interactions. To better establish strengths and weaknesses of this approach, we empirically evaluate the resulting learning system against other algorithms in three different RSGs.

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