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Truthfulness of a Proportional Sharing Mechanism in Resource Exchange

2019-11-22 | |  58 |   44 |   0
Abstract In this paper, we consider the popular proportional sharing mechanism and discuss the incentives and opportunities of an agent to lie for personal gains in resource exchange game. The main result is a proof that an agent manipulating the proportional sharing mechanism by misreporting its resource amount will not benefit its own utility eventually. This result establishes a strategic stability property of the resource exchange protocol. We further illustrate and confirm the result via network examples.

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