Civic Crowdfunding for Agents with Negative Valuations and Agents withAsymmetric Beliefs
Abstract
In the last decade, civic crowdfunding has proved
to be effective in generating funds for the provision of public projects. However, the existing literature deals only with citizen’s with positive valuation and symmetric belief towards the project’s provision. In this work, we present novel mechanisms
which break these two barriers, i.e., mechanisms
which incorporate negative valuation and asymmetric belief, independently. For negative valuation,
we present a methodology for converting existing
mechanisms to mechanisms that incorporate agents
with negative valuations. Particularly, we adapt existing PPR and PPS mechanisms, to present novel
PPRN and PPSN mechanisms which incentivize
strategic agents to contribute to the project based
on their true preferences. With respect to asymmetric belief, we propose a reward scheme Belief
Based Reward (BBR) based on Robust Bayesian
Truth Serum mechanism. With BBR, we propose
a general mechanism for civic crowdfunding which
incorporates asymmetric agents. We leverage PPR
and PPS, to present PPRx and PPSx. We prove that
in PPRx and PPSx, agents with greater belief towards the project’s provision contribute more than
agents with lesser belief. Further, we also show
that contributions are such that the project is provisioned at equilibrium