资源论文Identify the Nash Equilibrium in Static Games with Random Payoffs

Identify the Nash Equilibrium in Static Games with Random Payoffs

2020-03-10 | |  68 |   39 |   0

Abstract

We study the problem on how to learn the pure Nash Equilibrium of a two-player zero-sum static game with random payoffs under unknown distributions via efficient payoff queries. We introduce a multi-armed bandit model to this problem due to its ability to find the best arm efficientl among random arms and propose two algorithms for this problem—LUCB-G based on the confidence bounds and a racing algorithm based on successive action elimination. We provide an analysis on the sample complexity lower bound when the Nash Equilibrium exists.

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