资源论文Efficient Regret Minimization in Non-Convex Games

Efficient Regret Minimization in Non-Convex Games

2020-03-10 | |  60 |   54 |   0

Abstract

We consider regret minimization in repeated games with non-convex loss functions. Minimizing the standard notion of regret is computationally intractable. Thus, we define a natural notion of regret which permits efficient optimization and generalizes offline guarantees for convergence to an approximate local optimum. We give gradient-based methods that achieve optimal regret, which in turn guarantee convergence to equilibrium in this framework.

上一篇:Differentially Private Submodular Maximization: Data Summarization in Disguise

下一篇:Sequence to Better Sequence: Continuous Revision of Combinatorial Structures

用户评价
全部评价

热门资源

  • The Variational S...

    Unlike traditional images which do not offer in...

  • Learning to Predi...

    Much of model-based reinforcement learning invo...

  • Stratified Strate...

    In this paper we introduce Stratified Strategy ...

  • A Mathematical Mo...

    Direct democracy, where each voter casts one vo...

  • Rating-Boosted La...

    The performance of a recommendation system reli...