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Weakly Consistent Optimal Pricing Algorithms in Repeated Posted-Price Auctions with Strategic Buyer

2020-03-16 | |  68 |   43 |   0

Abstract

We study revenue optimization learning algorithms for repeated posted-price auctions where a seller interacts with a single strategic buyer tha holds a fixed private valuation for a good and seeks to maximize his cumulative discounted surplus. We propose a novel algorithm that never decreases offered prices and has a tight strategic regret bound of 图片.png(log log T ). This result closes the open research question on the existence of a no-regret horizon-independent weakly consistent pricing. We also show that the property of nondecreasing prices is nearly necessary for a weakly consistent algorithm to be a no-regret one.

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