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nash equilibria in concurrent games with lexicographic preferences

2019-11-04 | |  63 |   35 |   0
Abstract We study concurrent games with finite-memory strategies where players are given a Bu?chi and a mean-payoff objective, which are related by a lexicographic order: a player first prefers to satisfy its Bu?chi objective, and then prefers to minimise costs, which are given by a mean-payoff function. In particular, we show that deciding the existence of a strict Nash equilibrium in such games is decidable, even if players’ deviations are implemented as infinite memory strategies.

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