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Egalitarian Committee Scoring Rules

2019-11-05 | |  79 |   42 |   0
Abstract We introduce and study the class of egalitarian variants of committee scoring rules, where instead of summing up the scores that voters assign to committees—as is done in the utilitarian variants— the score of a committee is taken to be the lowest score assigned to it by any voter. We focus on five rules, which are egalitarian analogues of SNTV, the k-Borda rule, the Chamberlin–Courant rule, the Bloc rule, and the Pessimist rule. We establish their computational complexity, provide their initial axiomatic study, and perform experiments to represent the action of these rules graphically.

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