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》 资源 》论文》Pairwise Liquid Democracy Markus Brill1 and Nimrod Talmon2

Pairwise Liquid Democracy Markus Brill1 and Nimrod Talmon2

2019-11-05 | |  63 |   40 |   0
Abstract In a liquid democracy, voters can either vote directly or delegate their vote to another voter of their choice. We consider ordinal elections, and study a model of liquid democracy in which voters specify partial orders and use several delegates to refine them. This flexibility, however, comes at a price, as individual rationality (in the form of transitive preferences) can no longer be guaranteed. We discuss ways to detect and overcome such complications. Based on the framework of distance rationalization, we introduce novel variants of voting rules that are tailored to the liquid democracy context.

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