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》 资源 》论文》Probabilistic Verification for Obviously Strategyproof Mechanisms Diodato Ferraioli Carmine Ventre

Probabilistic Verification for Obviously Strategyproof Mechanisms Diodato Ferraioli Carmine Ventre

2019-11-05 | |  67 |   31 |   0
Abstract Obviously strategyproof (OSP) mechanisms maintain the incentive compatibility of agents that are not fully rational. They have been object of a number of studies since their recent definition. A research agenda, initiated in [Ferraioli and Ventre, 2017], is to find a small set (possibly, the smallest) of conditions allowing to implement an OSP mechanism. To this aim, we define a model of probabilistic verification wherein agents are caught misbehaving with a certain probability, and show how OSP mechanisms can implement every social choice function at the cost of either imposing very large fines or verifying a linear number of agents.

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