资源分类
》 资源 》论文》Ceteris Paribus Majority for Social Ranking

Ceteris Paribus Majority for Social Ranking

2019-11-05 | |  62 |   35 |   0
Abstract We study the problem of finding a social ranking over individuals or objects given a ranking over coalitions formed by them. We investigate the use of a ceteris paribus majority principle as a social ranking solution from classical axioms of social choice theory. Faced with a Condorcet-like paradox, we analyze the consequences of restricting the domain according to an adapted version of single-peakedness. We conclude with a discussion on different interpretations of incompleteness of the ranking over coalitions and its exploitation for defining new social rankings, providing a new rule as an example.

上一篇：Payoff Control in the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma

下一篇：Computational Aspects of the Preference Cores of Supermodular Two-Scenario Cooperative Games

用户评价
全部评价

热门资源

  • The Variational S...

    Unlike traditional images which do not offer in...

  • Learning to Predi...

    Much of model-based reinforcement learning invo...

  • Stratified Strate...

    In this paper we introduce Stratified Strategy ...

  • A Mathematical Mo...

    Direct democracy, where each voter casts one vo...

  • Joint Pose and Ex...

    Facial expression recognition (FER) is a challe...