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》 资源 》论文》Approval-Based Multi-Winner Rules and Strategic Voting Martin Lackner1 and Piotr Skowron2

Approval-Based Multi-Winner Rules and Strategic Voting Martin Lackner1 and Piotr Skowron2

2019-11-05 | |  66 |   47 |   0
Abstract We investigate the possibility of strategic voting in approval-based multiwinner rules. In particular, we define three axiomatic properties that guarantee resilience to certain forms of strategic voting: independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA), monotonicity, and SD-strategyproofness. In this paper, we systematically analyze multiwinner rules based on these axioms and provide a finegrained picture of their resilience to strategic voting. Both our axiomatic and experimental analysis show that approval-based multiwinner rules are generally very susceptible to strategic voting—with one exception: Multiwinner Approval Voting.

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