资源论文A Social Welfare Optimal Sequential Allocation Procedure? Thomas Kalinowski Nina Narodytska and Toby Walsh

A Social Welfare Optimal Sequential Allocation Procedure? Thomas Kalinowski Nina Narodytska and Toby Walsh

2019-11-08 | |  79 |   51 |   0
Abstract We consider a simple sequential allocation procedure for sharing indivisible items between agents in which agents take turns to pick items. Supposing additive utilities and independence between the agents, we show that the expected utility of each agent is computable in polynomial time. Using this result, we prove that the expected utilitarian social welfare is maximized when agents take alternate turns. We also argue that this mechanism remains optimal when agents behave strategically.

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