Consider the following scenario: a group of agents is tasked with completing some projects; the agents divide into groups, and using the resources available to each group, agents generate profifits, which must in turn be divided among group members. Cooperative game theory [Peleg and Sudholter, ¨ 2007] studies such scenarios; formally, Given a set of agents N = {1, . . . , n}, the value of each subset S of N is given by a function v : 2N → R. Agents fifirst form a coalition structure CS by partitioning into disjoint sets; then, the value of each subset S ∈ CS is divided among the members of S. Such payoff divisions are also called imputations. Given a game G = hN, vi, a solution concept for G is a set of imputations that share some desirable properties; for example, the core of a game G is the set of all payoff divisions such that for all S ⊆ N, the total payoff to S is at least v(S). That is, the core is the set of all stable payoff divisions, from which no subset of agents would want to deviate