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》 资源 》论文》Hustling in Repeated Zero-Sum Games with Imperfect Execution ? Christopher Archibald and Yoav Shoham

Hustling in Repeated Zero-Sum Games with Imperfect Execution ? Christopher Archibald and Yoav Shoham

2019-11-12 | |  51 |   50 |   0
Abstract We study repeated games in which players have imperfect execution skill and one player’s true skill is not common knowledge. In these settings the possibility arises of a player “hustling”, or pretending to have lower execution skill than they actually have. Focusing on repeated zero-sum games, we provide a hustle-proof strategy; this strategy maximizes a player’s payoff, regardless of the true skill level of the other player.

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