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》 资源 》论文》Approximately Strategy-Proof Voting Eleanor Birrell? and Rafael Pass†

Approximately Strategy-Proof Voting Eleanor Birrell? and Rafael Pass†

2019-11-12 | |  60 |   37 |   0
Abstract The classic Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem establishes that only dictatorial voting rules are strategyproof; under any other voting rule, players have an incentive to lie about their true preferences. We consider a new approach for circumventing this result: we consider randomized voting rules that only approximate a deterministic voting rule and only are approximately strategy-proof. We show that any deterministic voting rule can be approximated by an approximately strategy-proof randomized voting rule, and we provide asymptotically tight lower bounds on the parameters required by such voting rules.

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