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》 资源 》论文》The Complexity of Safe Manipulation under Scoring Rules Egor Ianovski Lan Yu Edith Elkind Mark C. Wilson

The Complexity of Safe Manipulation under Scoring Rules Egor Ianovski Lan Yu Edith Elkind Mark C. Wilson

2019-11-12 | |  61 |   41 |   0
Abstract [Slinko and White, 2008] have recently introduced a new model of coalitional manipulation of voting rules under limited communication, which they call safe strategic voting. The computational aspects of this model were ?rst studied by [Hazon and Elkind, 2010], who provide polynomial-time algorithms for ?nding a safe strategic vote under kapproval and the Bucklin rule. In this paper, we answer an open question of [Hazon and Elkind, 2010] by presenting a polynomial-time algorithm for ?nding a safe strategic vote under the Borda rule. Our results for Borda generalize to several interesting classes of scoring rules.

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