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》 资源 》论文》Parliamentary Voting Procedures: Agenda Control, Manipulation, and Uncertainty

Parliamentary Voting Procedures: Agenda Control, Manipulation, and Uncertainty

2019-11-18 | |  96 |   46 |   0

Abstract We study computational problems for two popular parliamentary voting procedures: the amendment procedure and the successive procedure. While finding successful manipulations or agenda controls is tractable for both procedures, our real-world experimental results indicate that most elections cannot be manipulated by a few voters and agenda control is typically impossible. If the voter preferences are incomplete, then finding possible winners is NP-hard for both procedures. Whereas finding necessary winners is coNP-hard for the amendment procedure, it is polynomial-time solvable for the successive one.

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