Abstract Stable matchings can be computed by deferred acceptance (DA) algorithms. However such algorithms become incomplete when complementarities exist among the agent preferences: they can fail to find a stable mat ing even when one exists. In this paper we examine stable matching problems arising from labour market with couples (SMP-C). The classical problem of matching residents into hospital programs is an example. Couples introduce complementarities under which DA algorithms become incomplete. In fact, SMP-C is NP-complete. Inspired by advances in SAT and integer programming (IP) solvers we investigate encoding SMP-C into SAT and IP and then using state-of-the-art SAT and IP solvers to solve it. We also implemented two previous DA algorithms. After comparing the performance of these different solution methods we find that encoding to SAT can be surprisingly effective, but that our encoding to IP do not scale as well. Using our SAT encoding we are able to determine that the DA algorithms fail on a non-trivial number of cases where a stable matching exists. The SAT and IP encodings also have the property that they can ver ify that no stable matching exists, something that the DA algorithms cannot do.